A Manchester-based personal injury firm has had a former client’s claim for an assessment of their costs bill struck out after it was served at the firm’s old address.

Costs Judge Jason Rowley said there was ‘no evidence’ the claimant had checked the defendant’s address before commencing proceedings.

He also dismissed the suggestion that the defendant firm had taken an ‘opportunistic’ approach by not referring to its new address until time for service had expired. ‘There is nothing within the rules to require one party to assist the other,’ Rowley said.

In Kelly v Ralli Ltd, the Senior Courts Costs Office struck out the claimant’s claim for an assessment of his former lawyers’ bill and also refused an application to dispense with service.

Sean Kelly had instructed Ralli Limited in a personal injury claim which concluded in 2019, when the firm’s registered office was at Jackson House in Sale, Greater Manchester. The firm moved its registered office to Dalton House in Sale last year.

He instructed JG Solicitors and it wrote to Ralli last April, both by letter to Jackson House and by email, requesting a final statute bill to be produced.

Kelly then issued proceedings for an assessment of the bill – which was again sent to Jackson House and also emailed to a costs draftsman employed by Ralli’s costs lawyers.

There was no acknowledgement of service, but Ralli’s lawyers informed JG Solicitors in September, four days after time for service had expired, that service had not taken place and set out the Dalton House address.

JG Solicitors attempted to serve an amended claim form at Dalton House, but Ralli’s lawyers said they could not accept service given that the time for service had expired.

Kelly’s lawyers argued there had been effective service of the proceedings at Jackson House or, alternatively, that ‘consent to service by email had been provided given that the entire communication from the defendant was via email’.

But Rowley said Kelly had not asked whether service by email could be used. ‘Either the claimant’s solicitors did not think it was necessary to do so, or, as seems more likely, did not intend the email version to be formal service,’ the judge said.

‘Although the claimant can point to an ineffective attempt to serve the proceedings in time by the permitted method of postal service, that is not sufficient to persuade a court to dispense with service,’ he added.

The judge also said: ‘Whilst the claimant has its suspicions as to the reasons for the defendant’s approach, the defendant is obviously entitled to rely upon the rules which, fundamentally, is all it has done here. The cause of the problems for the claimant lies elsewhere.’

 

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