Anonymising the names of judges

In Tickle v The BBC and others [2025] EWCA Civ 42, the Court of Appeal considered whether the courts had the power to make orders anonymising the names of judges. The issue concerned the anonymisation of the names of three judges who had presided over historical family proceedings concerning Sara Sharif. Although this was a family law case, it has wider significance.

The Family Division had previously dealt with various media applications for the disclosure of documents relating to the family proceedings. The judge at first instance made a reporting restriction order (the order) which prevented the media from reporting the names of the three judges who had been involved. The journalists appealed.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the authorities on the importance of the principle of open justice and stressed that: ‘Open justice and transparency of justice were fundamental and paramount principles that were applicable here.’ The court noted that the relevant legislation (for example, section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960) expressly excludes the anonymity of judges, and the relevant case law (for example, Derbyshire County Council v Marsden [2023] EWHC 1892 (Fam)) makes clear that the statutory restrictions on the information in children’s proceedings are there to protect the anonymity of children and not the professionals. The Court of Appeal explained that judges were in a special position: they are appointed by the state to fulfil a crucial public office, and they are required, save in limited circumstances, to sit in public when discharging their duties.  

The Court of Appeal then considered the following three issues.

Whether the court had jurisdiction to anonymise the names of the historical judges

The Court of Appeal found that the judge was wrong in anonymising the names of the judges, and that he had ‘no jurisdictional foundation for making the anonymity order’. The Court of Appeal noted that section 6 (acts of public authorities) of the Human Rights Act (HRA 1998) did not require the judge to identify risks from his own experiences that the judges may be exposed to. This could have been achieved through other means – for example, assistance from HM Courts & Tribunals Service. There was no evidence before the judge for him to conclude that the thresholds of articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the HRA 1998 had been met.

The Court of Appeal reiterated that it was the role of the judge to sit in public and, even if sitting in private, to be identified, and this was necessary for a transparent justice system. Although the Court of Appeal acknowledged that it might be possible for section 6 of the HRA 1998 to permit an anonymity order relating to judges, it was difficult to envisage such a situation arising because: (i) such an order could only be justified with compelling evidence as to the risks to the judges in question; (ii) the court would have to be satisfied that the risks could not be addressed via other security measures; and (iii) the court would have to conclude that the risks were so serious that, exceptionally, they justified overriding the fundamental principle of open justice.

Irregularity for lack of submissions, evidence or reasons

The Court of Appeal reiterated that, in the absence of specific evidence about risks or threats to the fundamental rights under the European Convention on Human Rights/HRA 1998, the judge should not have taken any steps to anonymise the historical judges under section 6 of the HRA 1998. It was obviously good practice for judges to consider submissions and evidence before making an order of their own motion. In circumstances where the situation is so urgent that an order is necessary, it may be appropriate to make the order first and to seek submissions later. In the present case, the judge had no evidence or submissions before him to justify making the order.  

Inappropriate bias or unfairness towards the media

The Court of Appeal found that it was ‘unfair of the judge to say, with such vehemence, that the journalists had been guilty of inaccurate, unfair and irresponsible reporting. The decision to adjourn the journalists’ application for permission to appeal just before the end of term was akin to dismissing the application’. Also, ‘it was excessive in the circumstances to accuse the journalists of irresponsible reporting even if the application for permission had been technically adjourned rather than dismissed’.

Following the ruling, the judges were allowed seven days before their names were published to allow HMCTS to put measures in place to protect them from any potential harm once their names were released.

By ruling against the unnecessary anonymisation of judges, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the importance of the principle of open justice in promoting transparency in the justice system, and scrutiny and accountability of judges which is central in safeguarding public confidence in the judiciary and the administration of justice. The decision makes clear the judges, as public servants, must remain visible and accountable when discharging their duties. It also protects the important role of the media in reporting on proceedings.

Masood Ahmed is an associate professor of law at the University of Leicester and a member of the Law Society’s Dispute Resolution Committee