A global firm has won its right to more than £400,000 in fees after the High Court dismissed an appeal over a costs master's summary judgment. 

Holman Fenwick Willan and its associated Abu Dhabi entity, Holman Fenwick Willan MEA, acted for businessman Wahid Samady in a number of matters and submitted bills for around £598,965. Samady subsequently ‘lost confidence’ in the work carried out by the firm and an agreement was made for it to complete disclosure on litigation before the retainer would be terminated.

A payment plan was agreed setting out a £50,000 discount if outstanding invoices of £442,000 were paid on time. In a letter to Samady the firm stated ‘you are personally liable for and guarantee to HFW all of the payments set out in this letter'.

However Samady argued that there were ‘shortcomings in the disclosure’ and said he suffered a loss of £90,000 in additional costs as a result of ‘[instructing another firm] to resolve the disclosure issues.’ He appealed a summary decision by a master of the King’s Bench Division approving a claim of £417,000 plus interest.

However in Holman Fenwick Willan LLP v Wahid Samady, Mr Justice Freedman found the letter could be said: ‘It is apparent that there was a significant discount from the invoiced sums to the payment plan even before the discount.’ He found Samady to be bound by a contractual agreement. ‘The term “personally liable” was not inconsistent with a guarantee because a guarantee gives rise to a personal liability.

He said: ‘Whatever terms have been used by the parties, Mr Samady’s liability is at least in part that of a primary obligor not only to the extent of whatever was his prior obligation, but to the full extent of the payment plan. Against this background, the words “personally liable” are not redundant or tautological, but state as often happens in commercial documents including agreements of lending or other forms of credit, that the liability is both that of primary obligor and guarantor.’

He added that the payment plan ’was a liability assumed under the agreement and not by reference to the bills.’

The judgment found there was no evidence to support the additional costs of £90,000, that there was no real prospect of Samady’s defence succeeding and no triable issue under the Solicitors Act 1974. 

Dismissing the appeal, Freedman said: ‘In all the circumstances, [the costs master] was correct to find that there was no real prospect of a defence and no other compelling reason to give permission to defend. It follows that the appeal is dismissed.’

  • This article was amended at 1600 on 8 February to clarify that the appeal was against a summary judgment by a master of the Kings Bench Division, not a costs master. 

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