Disciplinary procedures - horse-racing - professional bodies - regulatory bodies - - suspension pending determination of criminal proceedings

Kieren Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority: QBD (Mr Justice Davis): 28 July 2006


The applicant jockey (F) applied for declarations and an injunction relating to a decision of the appeal board of the respondent authority prohibiting F from riding at races in Great Britain until the conclusion of criminal proceedings against him, or further order.


F had been charged with conspiracy to defraud both account holders of a betting company and people who had placed bets with bookmakers by dishonestly agreeing not to permit horses ridden by certain jockeys to run on their merits, in that riding practices would be used that would interfere with the horses' running and affect the result of the races, and laying those horses to lose on exchange provided by the betting company. F denied the charges and the trial had yet to take place.


The matter was referred to the authority and, at a hearing, a special panel decided that F should be prohibited from riding at races in Great Britain until the criminal proceedings had been concluded. The panel concluded that it was not for it to assess the strength of the criminal case, but that, after extensive investigations, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) had decided there was a prima facie case against F. F appealed against the panel's decision.


The appeal board upheld F's ban and determined that it was not the function of a regulatory body to conduct a full review of the evidence in the criminal proceedings. F argued that: the board and the panel had erred in refusing to hear his submissions as to the weakness of the CPS case against him, and should have acceded to F's request to study video evidence of the races concerned and considered the transcripts of his police interviews; and the board's sanction was unjustified and disproportionate.


Held, both the panel and the board were right in their conclusions that it was not for them to consider the evidence as to the alleged weakness of the CPS case. They were plainly right to proceed on the basis that the CPS had concluded that there was sufficient substance in the matter to justify charges being brought (R (on the application of Walker) v General Medical Council (2003) EWHC (Admin) 2038 applied). F's submissions involved second guessing the CPS and were an attempt to cherry-pick limited aspects of the prospective evidence to demonstrate alleged weaknesses of the case. That was not a valid exercise, as it focused on only part of the case.


This case was complex, and the consideration of but a portion of the prospective evidence at the behest of one party only with regard to only some aspects of the CPS case would not give a true indication of the strength or weakness of the case taken as a whole. The decision of the panel and the board not to receive video evidence and interview transcripts was lawful and justified. While it might be that a regulatory body could, in appropriate circumstances, justifiably go into an allegation of weakness of a particular charge made by the CPS, that regulatory body had to decide whether to do so by reference to the circumstances of each case.


Such cases, especially where the charges were grave and complex, as in this one, and probably generally, were likely to be relatively rare. In circumstances comparable to the these, a disciplinary tribunal was not always obliged, if asked, to hear evidence and receive submissions from the affected party as to the alleged weaknesses of the charges brought.


There was no doubt that the board's sanction would be of significant and irremediable detriment to F and those connected to him. However, sufficient reason had not been shown to justify the court's interference in the board's decision to make the ban it had. It was a decision within the ambit of a proper exercise of discretion, exercised by an expert body that was entitled to weigh the matter as it had (Bradley v Jockey Club [2005] EWCA Civ 1056, (2005) The Times, 14 July and National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd v Flaherty [2005] EWCA Civ 1117, (2005) The Times, 5 October applied).


Application refused.


D Pannick QC, J Kelsey-Fry QC, Pushpinder Saini, J Harvie QC (instructed by BCL Burton Copeland) for the applicant; M Warby QC, J Dean (instructed by Charles Russell) for the respondent.