Negligence – Hospitality and leisure – Breach of duty of care – Foreseeability

Everett and Anor v Comojo (UK) Ltd (T/A the Metropolitan and Ors): CA (Civ Div) (Lords Justices Rix, Richards, Lady Justice Smith): 18 January 2011

The appellants (E) appealed against a decision dismissing their claims for damages for personal injury arising from an incident at a nightclub, owned and managed by the respondent company (C), when they were injured in a knife attack perpetrated by another guest (G).

The nightclub was part of a hotel. Use of the nightclub was restricted to members and their guests and hotel residents. E were guests at the nightclub. It was said that one of the group they were with touched a waitress (K) on the bottom. She did not complain but the incident was witnessed by a member (B) who was aggrieved on her behalf. He told her, more than once, that those responsible would apologise to her before the end of the evening. B was later joined at the nightclub by G. K was concerned that there might be a confrontation and went to speak to the manager. At that time E decided to leave the nightclub. B asked for an apology which was not forthcoming. G then attacked E and stabbed them with a knife. The judge held that C could owe a duty to protect its guests from the actions of a third party, on the basis that there might be such a degree of proximity between the parties that a legal duty would arise. However, he held that no duty of care arose in the circumstances because, at the time when K left the bar to speak to the manager, there was not a sufficiently great risk of injury; she was not under a duty to do anything about G at that stage. If she had done nothing, she could not have been criticised. All she had was a suspicion that there might be some sort of confrontation. But it was not known that G had a weapon and there had been no history of B or his associates being violent. E submitted that in the circumstances the judge should have concluded that there was a duty of care and that there had been a breach. C contended that there should be no duty on the managers of a bar to protect guests from violence by other guests and, if there was any duty at all, it should be drawn very restrictively.

Held: (1) The test for the existence of a duty of care was the threefold test of proximity, foreseeability and whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty, Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 HL and Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 followed (see paragraph 24 of judgment).

(2) The relationship between the management of a nightclub and its guests was of sufficient proximity to justify the existence of a duty of care. It was foreseeable that there was some risk that one guest might assault another; that was recognised by C’s own risk assessment. It was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the management of a nightclub in respect of injuries caused by a third party, provided that the scope of the duty was appropriately set (paragraphs 31-33).

(3) Thus there was a duty on the management of a nightclub in respect of the actions of third parties on the premises, but the standard of care imposed or the scope of the duty had also to be fair, just and reasonable. As between the managers of a nightclub and guests, there should not be a higher degree of foreseeability than was required under the common duty of care in the Occupiers Liability Act 1957, Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 HL considered. The degree of proximity, including the ­economic relationship, between the two was so close that no special rule of foreseeability was required in the interests of fairness, justice and ­reasonableness. The judge did not ­misdirect himself when he adopted the Australian case of Chordas v Bryant (Wellington) [1988] 91 ALR 149 Fed Ct (Aus) (Full Ct) as the basis of the duty, Chordas considered ­(paragraphs 34, 35).

(4) In all the circumstances, K had not been in breach of duty. She had realised that there was a possibility of a confrontation between G and one or more of the members of E’s group. But there was no reason to think that a confrontation was imminent. The incident to which B had taken exception had occurred a considerable time earlier. B had no previous history of causing trouble, either himself or through his associates. K could not have been criticised even if she had done nothing. As it was, she went to speak to her manager. That was a reasonable thing for her to do. There was no apparent urgency; it was not as if a confrontation had begun and the risk of violence was imminent (paragraph 37).

Appeal dismissed.

Simon Butler, Johnathan Payne (instructed by Stone Rowe Brewer) for the appellant; Lord Faulks QC, Quintin Tudor-Evans (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the respondent.