Defamation – Corruption – Libel – Newspapers

Andrew James Miller v Associated Newspapers Ltd: QBD (Mr Justice Eady) 31 March 2010

The applicant newspaper publisher applied to strike out the claim for defamation brought by the respondent (M).

The applicant had published an article claiming that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner at the time had used public money to employ M, who was an old friend, through his company, to help him to improve his public image. M sued the publisher, claiming that the article bore two defamatory meanings: first, that he had corruptly exploited his friendship with the commissioner to obtain a large improper payment from public funds; second, that he had agreed, on behalf of his company, to act as the commissioner’s image consultant under a ‘vanity contract’, knowing that his company lacked the relevant knowledge or experience, thus improperly obtaining payment for work that his company was not competent to do. The publisher contended that those meanings were unsustainable, and that the article was incapable of bearing any meaning defamatory of M. The publisher submitted that the first pleaded meaning involved attributing active steps to M which the article did not mention, so they could emerge only by inference, and such inference did not reasonably arise from the article; and that it amounted to an allegation of criminal behaviour, in other words a level one meaning per Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, [2003] EMLR 11.

Held: The essence of the charge appeared to be one of ‘cronyism’ or ‘back-scratching’. However, it was not for the court upon the instant application to decide what the words meant, but only whether they were capable of bearing one or more defamatory meanings. Nor was it for the court to draft the meanings for M. But it was not prepared to rule that the words were incapable of reflecting adversely on M merely because he was portrayed only as the recipient or beneficiary of favours, rather than an active instigator on his own behalf. The Chase level one meaning in the first pleaded meaning put the matter far too high, Chase applied. The words were not capable of bearing the second pleaded meaning either. There was nothing in the article to convey the impression that M knew that his company had no relevant knowledge or experience, or that he consciously obtained payment for work that he knew his company was not competent to carry out. Therefore both pleaded meanings would be struck out. However, the action as a whole would not be struck out. It would not be perverse for a reasonable reader, having read the article, to come to the conclusion that it reflected adversely on M’s character or integrity. Sometimes such allegations could be to a person’s discredit even though he had kept within the letter of the law. That consideration underlined why it was appropriate to leave the matter for a jury to assess, rather than for a judge to rule the matter out at a preliminary stage.

Application granted in part.

Mark Warby QC, Adam Speker (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) for the applicant; Hugh Tomlinson QC, Lorna Skinner (instructed by Simons Muirhead & Burton) for the respondent.