Council tax - Rating - Rating list

Wilson v Jo Coll (listing officer): Queen's Bench Division, Administrative Court (London): 13 October 2011

The claimant owned a two bedroom semi-detached 1930's property (the property) which appeared in the valuation list since the list was started in 1993, valued in Band B. The property was vacant since 2007 and was in a state of disrepair. It had been for a period of 12 months designated as an exempt dwelling under the Council Tax (Exempt Dwelling Order) 1992, SI 1992/558 (the 1992 order).

The defendant listing officer under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 had the duty of compiling and maintaining a valuation list for the local authority to show each dwelling which was situated in the billing authority’s area and the valuation bands applicable to the dwelling. The definition of 'dwelling' was any property which by virtue of the definition of 'hereditament' in section 115(1) of the General Rate Act 1967, would have been a hereditament for the purposes of that act.

The definition of heriditament was broadly whether a building was capable of occupation for the purposes of which it was had been intended. The claimant was billed for council tax on the property. In due course, she appealed to the Valuation Tribunal for England (the tribunal) on the basis that the property was in a state of disrepair. In September 2010, the tribunal decided that as a matter of law the property although unoccupied and in a state of disrepair was to be continued to be listed as a band B property and that the claimant remained liable to pay council tax.

In so deciding, the tribunal had regard to regulation 6(2)(e) of the Council Tax (Situation and valuation of dwelling) 1992, SI 1992/550 (the regulations) which required that in conducting a valuation exercise it was assumed that the dwelling be in a reasonable state of repair and that applying the case of R (on the application of Silverstone v East Sussex Valuation Tribunal (unreported) (1996) Times that assumption was irrebutable. It further found that there was no need to include the concept of economic repair. The tribunal found that the property was a hereditament as it was occupied at the inception of the list in 1993 and had remained so until 2007 and there had been no changes since then to affect its status as a hereditament and it did not cease to be a hereditament because it was in a state of disrepair. The claimant appealed.

The claimant submitted, inter alia, that as the property was not in reasonable repair it was not capable of valuation and further that there was the assumption that repairs were only reasonable if they were economic to undertake. The defendant submitted, inter alia, that the question of whether a property continued to be a hereditament according to the relevant regime did not depend on whether repairs could be economically carried out and that buildings in need of repair remained a hereditament.

In support of that submission he relied on two legislative provisions first regulation 6(2)(e) of the regulations 1992 and article 3 of the 1992 order which stated that a dwelling requiring major repair work to render it habitable could be exempt from liability to pay tax for a limited period of time. Both those legislative provisions made no sense if it was not assumed that a hereditament existed although the repairs were not economic. It was further submitted by the defendant that there was a distinction in law between the valuation of the hereditament and the question of whether a hereditament existed or not and there was a risk of confusion unless those distinctions were kept in mind. The appeal would be allowed.

There was a distinction between the valuation of a hereditament and the question of whether a hereditament existed or not.

In the instant case, the tribunal had not adopted the correct approach. It had confused the two concepts of the valuation of the hereditment and the issue of whether a hereditament existed or not. The question for the tribunal was whether a hereditament existed or not; that was a question of fact not law. It was clear from the tribunal's decision that it had regarded the question before it as a point of law and in so doing had fallen into error.

It had applied the Silverstone case which did not go to the existence of a hereditament and referred to the statutory assumption as being absolute. It was in error in regarding the statutory assumption as being absolute. In the context of council tax for domestic properties, regulation 6(2)(e) of the regulations did not import a concept of economic repairs and it was plain that no such qualification existed in the instant context and therefore the tribunal had been correct on that issue. The decision would be remitted to the tribunal for reconsideration.

The claimant appeared in person. Jacqueline Lean and Galina Ward (instructed by Solicitors Office for HM Revenue and Customs) for the defendant.