For those who loved the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Bill, 12 November 2009 will have been an emotional day. It was then that, with one touch of the royal wand, the bill became an act of parliament. And the act is just the ticket for those afflicted by ennui and information underload on these long winter evenings. With nine parts containing 150 sections, together with seven exciting schedules, the act is a veritable feast.

Part 1 (Democracy and Involvement) includes (in chapter 1) duties of principal local authorities to promote among local people an understanding of their functions, their democratic arrangements and how the public can take part in these arrangements.

Chapter 2 of part 1 (Petitions to Local Authorities) includes requirements for principal local authorities to ‘provide a facility for making petitions in electronic form to the authority’ and to make a scheme for the handling of petitions meeting specified conditions. The same chapter also deals with petitions requiring an officer to be called to account. As the explanatory notes indicate, the intention of the chapter is to ‘make local decision-making in relation to petitions made to principal local authorities more transparent, by requiring them to respond to petitions which meet certain criteria, and making the response to petitions publicly available’.

Chapter 3 (Involvement in Functions of Public Authorities) requires (by section 23) applicable authorities to take such steps as they consider appropriate to involve representatives of those likely to be affected by, or otherwise interested in, the exercise of any of their relevant functions. However, this duty applies only if the authority in question considers such involvement to be appropriate. The public authorities in question include the Health and Safety Executive, police authorities, chief police officers and regional development agencies. The involvement includes provision of information or consultation about the exercise of the relevant function.

Chapter 4 (Housing) deals with the establishment and assistance of ­bodies representing tenants and so on, while chapter 5 amends provisions in the Local Government Act 1972 regarding freemen, honorary aldermen and honorary freemen. We are therefore likely (per section 29, which amends the existing section 249 of the Local Government Act 1972) to see some honorary alderwomen (in addition to honorary aldermen) appearing around the country. The amendments will also extend the section 249 power to confer the title ‘honorary freeman’ to all principal councils, parish and community councils and charter trustees in England, and the title of ‘honorary freewoman’ will also be available. But if updates to the politically restricted post-provisions of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 are what you are really seeking, then chapter 6 is for you.

Part 2 rolls in under the heading ‘Local Authorities: Governance and Audit’, with section 31 going in to bat with provision for scrutiny officers. The explanatory notes point out that, typically, scrutiny officers will promote scrutiny more widely within the authority and with ‘local government partners’, as well as providing ‘advice and support to members of the authority’s committee(s) in undertaking their work’. But, courtesy of new section 21ZA(4) of the Local Government Act 2000, neither a head of paid service nor a monitoring or a chief finance officer can be a scrutiny officer. While heads of paid service and chief finance officers may feel a sense of ‘whatever’ about this, there may be some resonance among those monitoring officers who currently manage those likely to take on the scrutiny officer role. Section 32 makes provision for joint overview and scrutiny committees by substituting a new section 123 in the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 in place of the previous section.

Chapter 2 wheels out the new mutual insurance provision (see [2009] Gazette, 19 November, 17), and chapter 3 deals with the audit of ‘entities connected with local authorities’. The types of entity in question are any company, limited liability partnership, or industrial or provident society connected with a local authority and which also meets such other conditions as may be specified in regulations.

Part 3 is all about local government boundary and electoral change, and creates and makes provision surrounding the new Local Government Boundary Commission for England. With some modifications this will absorb the functions previously discharged by the Boundary Committee for England.

Parts 4, 5, 6 and 7 deal respectively with local authority economic assessments, regional strategy, economic prosperity boards and combined authorities and multi-area agreements. These have been well trailed following the introduction of the bill and (as the explanatory notes indicate) they ‘follow on from the Review of Sub-National Economic Development and Regeneration and the consultation document Prosperous Places: Taking Forward the Review of Sub National Economic Development and Regeneration’. They acknowledge the necessity of regional inter-authority strategic cooperation and include (among many other provisions, at ­section 71) provision for participating authorities to set up ‘Leaders’ Boards’ in this context. Part 8 deals with construction contracts and, while part 9 is apocalyptically entitled ‘Final’, it covers only innocent administrative details such as repeals, extent and commencement.

The 2009 act is a meaty measure and, although local authority lawyers, their clients and others are likely to be familiar with its principles, it will be necessary to check and become familiar with the text as now enacted to make sure that the provisions are in fact as you imagine them to be. While (like some members of parliament) the devil may have many homes, he continues to have a well-used pied-à-terre in the detail.

Climate change: akin to religion?The Australian geologist and sceptic of man-made climate change Professor Ian Plimer has described eco-guilt as ‘the new religion for urban populations which have lost their faith in Christianity’. Whatever your views on this contentious issue, Professor Plimer may have something of a legal point following a decision of Burton J in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) on 3 November 2009 in Nicholson v Grainger plc and others, and local government solicitors will want to reflect on the employment implications of this.

The respondent employee, having been dismissed by the employer in July 2008 (as it asserted, by reason of redundancy) had applied to the Employment Tribunal claiming unfair dismissal and discrimination, arguing that this was because of his asserted philosophical belief about climate change and the environment, contrary to the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003 No. 1660). The employee won and the case was appealed.

Regulation 2 of the 2003 regulations provides that: ‘religion’ means any religion; ‘belief’ means any religious or philosophical belief; and a reference to religion includes a reference to lack of religion, and a reference to belief includes a reference to lack of belief. And regulation 3 provides that for the purposes of those regulations: ‘a person (A) discriminates against another person (B) if… on the grounds of the religion or belief of B or of any other person except A (whether or not it is also A's religion or belief), A treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons…’

The three main issues between the parties were: (i) how far, if at all, the belief said to qualify for protection under the regulations is required to be similar to a religious belief; (ii) what limits (if any) should be placed upon the words ��philosophical belief’; and (iii) whether the authorities in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights were of relevance.

Burton J said that he found convention jurisprudence ‘extremely helpful in this relatively uncharted territory’ and noted from it the following implied limitations or criteria: (i) the belief must be genuinely held; (ii) it must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available; (iii) it must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; (iv) it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and (v) it must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.

In the circumstances, Burton J was satisfied that for the belief to be protected, it was necessary for it to have a similar status or cogency to a religious belief. But it was ‘not a bar to a philosophical belief being protected by the regulations if it is a one-off belief and not shared by others’. And in his view, ‘if a person can establish that he holds a philosophical belief which is based on science, as opposed, for example, to religion, then there is no reason to disqualify it from protection by the regulations’. In addition, the ‘existence of a positive philosophical belief does not depend upon the existence of a negative philosophical belief to the contrary'.

The EAT therefore upheld the Employment Tribunal to the extent that the asserted belief held by the employee upon which he bases his claim of discrimination is capable of being a belief for the purposes of the 2003 Regulations. However, at the full hearing, evidence would need to be adduced and tested in the light of the above limitations and criteria that what was done was on the grounds of his belief and that the belief was genuine.

Nicholas Dobson is a practising solicitor specialising in local government