HEALTH AND SAFETY



Accidents - breach of statutory duty - defective equipment - lifts - place of work - work equipment

PRP Architects v Precious Reid: CA (Civ Div) (Lords Justice Pill, Smith, Neuberger): 28 July 2006



The employer (P) appealed against a decision that it was liable in damages for personal injuries suffered by the respondent employee (R), by reason of a breach of statutory duty under regulation 5 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998.



P had leased second-floor offices where R had been employed as a receptionist. P had the right to use a lift in common with other tenants of the building, and paid service charges that included its maintenance by the landlord. Under the lease, P was able to compel the landlords to carry out such maintenance.



Leaving work one evening, R had taken the lift to the lobby and had been injured by the lift door closing on her hand. It was conceded that the safety devices that should have prevented the lift door closing had been defective.



R claimed damages for personal injury against P. The judge found that P had provided the lift for use by R at work, that it was work equipment within regulation 2(1) of the regulations, and that the lift was defective so that there was a breach of regulation 5(1). The judge found that for regulation 5 to apply, it was not necessary for R to suffer injury in the course of her employment, but she also held that R had in fact been injured in the course of her employment.



P argued that the lift was not an installation for use at work within the meaning of the regulations and not therefore work equipment within regulations 3 and 5; that the lift was not provided for use by an employee and not used by an employee at work within the meaning of regulation 3(2); that a lift outside P's premises and not owned or maintained by it was not work equipment made available to workers in the undertaking or establishment under article 3 of Council Directive 89/655, pursuant to which the regulations had been enacted; and that having left P's premises, R had not been acting in the course of her employment.



Held, the expression 'work equipment' should be given a broad construction and 'installation' was capable of covering a lift in a building as 'a large piece of equipment installed for use'. However, P had not disputed before the judge that the lift was work equipment and was precluded from arguing to the contrary on appeal.



The test was whether the equipment was being used 'at work'. The definition of 'at work' in the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 could not be transposed verbatim into the application of the regulations, as the Act did not create strict liabilities and the regulations did. Whether the employee was acting in the course of her employment was an important factor in deciding whether she was using equipment 'at work' at the material time. The degree of control over the equipment by the employer might also be a factor.



The expression as used in Council Directive 89/655 might import a spatial or geographical limitation on the places at which, and hence on the equipment to which, the duty attached.



The lift was the property of a third party but it was a facility used in the course of work, which was different from an object worked on, Hammond v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (2004) EWCA Civ 830, (2004) ICR 1467 considered. In the circumstances, when leaving work at the end of the day and using a lift located in the lobby of the building where she worked, R was using it 'at work' within the meaning of regulation 3(2). In this case, the line should not be drawn when R left her office to enter the lift or when the lift left the second floor, Armstrong Whitworth & Co Ltd v Redford (1920) AC 757 considered.



Appeal dismissed.



P Vincent (instructed by Berrymans Lace Mawer (Birmingham)) for the appellants; T Huckle (instructed by Cooks) for the respondent.