Change of circumstances – Entry clearances – Visas – Immigration Act 1971

Secretary of State for the Home Department v DB: CA (Civ Div) (Lords Justice Mummery, Thomas, Pitchford): 28 May 2010

The appellant secretary of state appealed against an order quashing the cancellation of the respondent’s visa. The respondent (D), a Ghanaian national, had been issued with a multiple entry visa to the UK which was valid from January 2008 until January 2010. It granted him entry clearance to the UK as a visitor for a period up to 180 days in any one stay, but excluded him from working. D arrived in the UK in January 2008 and overstayed by nine weeks. He returned to the UK in November 2008, where he was interviewed by an immigration officer and issued with a notice refusing him leave to enter.

D challenged that decision and a chief immigration officer issued an amended form IS 82A which stated that D was refused leave to enter on the basis that there had been a change of circumstance in that D was seeking entry to look after his uncle’s children for which he would be paid. The notice cancelled D’s leave under paragraph 2(A)(8) of the Immigration Act 1971 and paragraph 321A(1) of the Immigration Rules (HC395) and refused him leave to enter under paragraph 320(5) of the Rules. D challenged the decision to cancel his visa on the ground of change of circumstances. The judge found that the notice was not effective to act as a cancellation of D’s visa.

The judge quashed the cancellation of D’s visa but declined to quash the refusal of D’s leave to enter. The secretary of state submitted that (1) the judge mistakenly understood the effect of the notice as, on a true reading of the legislation and rules, it was not possible for the immigration officer lawfully to refuse entry without having first cancelled D’s visa; and (2) the judge imposed a test for ‘change of circumstances’, which had no legal justification, and the cancellation was properly imposed for change of circumstances. Therefore, refusal of leave to enter was justified under paragraph 320(5) of the rules.

Held: (1) The Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000 provided, by article 6(2)(B), that entry clearance might be cancelled in the event that the visitor sought to enter the UK for a purpose other than the purpose specified in the visa and, by article 6(1), that should the officer cancel the leave to enter, his decision would have the result that the entry clearance would cease to have effect. The question for construction was whether, notwithstanding the absence of an express power to refuse leave in the order and schedule 2 to the 1971 act, paragraph 320(5) of the rules was intended to apply to those who had existing leave to enter for a purpose different from the purpose for which they had arrived in the UK. The draftsman cannot have intended paragraph 320(5) to have the same power as paragraph 2A(2A) of schedule 2 to the 1971 act.

On arrival in the UK, D was seeking neither entry clearance nor leave to enter, he was relying on his existing entry clearance with its deemed leave to enter. The power of the immigration officer to examine him was confined, under paragraph 2A(2) and (2A), to the purpose of ascertaining whether there were grounds for cancellation of his leave to enter. It was only if D’s existing leave to enter was cancelled that he could properly be regarded as a person who was seeking leave to enter for a purpose other than that authorised by his visa. In D’s case, the power provided was not refusal but cancellation of the existing leave to enter under paragraph 2A(2A) and (8) of schedule 2. Only then did the power to refuse leave to enter under paragraph 320(5) come into play. It followed that the immigration officer's refusal of leave to enter under paragraph 320(5) depended for its validity upon the lawfulness of the cancellation under paragraph 321A(1) of the rules. The judge’s decision was incorrect. The advice contained in the section of the current Border Force Operations Manual entitled Cancellation of entry clearance that has effect as leave to enter was wrong as it incorrectly treated refusal synonymously with cancellation.

(2) The judge extracted a principle from the Home Office guidance that if the change of circumstance was comprised in an alteration of purpose of visits in the mind of the visitor, it would be a change which qualified under paragraph 321(A) only if the material persuaded the immigration officer that there was a permanent intention not to use the visit visa for proper visits but only for visits which were going to breach the terms of the visa. Such a principle could not be derived from the guidance. The decision that there had been such a change of circumstances that D’s leave should be cancelled under paragraph 321A(1) was not flawed on public law grounds.

Appeal allowed.

Cathryn McGahey (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for the appellant; O Ngwuocha (instructed by Carl Martin) for the respondent.