Publication of information - Mother making false allegations about father - Local authority applying to make information public

Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Haigh and others: Fam Div (Sir Nicholas Wall): 22 August 2011

The first respondent, H, was the mother of a child, X, who was eight. She had separated from her husband, T, in 2005. Since that time, H had made a number of public statements designed to suggest that T was a paedophile and unsuited to care for his daughter, several in defiance of court orders, and had induced X to make similar statements.

Those statements had been made, among other things, on a website set up for that purpose, and to parents at the school X attended. They had been repeated by individuals campaigning on H’s behalf, and had resulted not only in severe difficulties for T, but in four examinations being made of X by professionals to determine whether the alleged abuse had occurred.

In addition, the matter had been mentioned in parliament after, in breach of a court order, a member of parliament had deployed parliamentary privilege to highlight the case. In November 2010, the court ruled that X should be the subject of a full care order. In February 2011, the court decided that a full care order should be imposed and that X should move to T’s care. In both cases, the court held that T was not a paedophile and rejected H’s claims to that effect.

The local authority applied to put into the public domain aspects of the care proceedings under part IV of the Children Act 1989 (the act), which, in accordance with normal practice, had been heard in private. That application was supported by T and X’s guardian, with the exception that X should remain anonymous.

The authority submitted that, in the circumstances, it was appropriate for its own information document to be incorporated into a public judgment that addressed the reasons for its release. It contended that, although the allegations against T had all been false, neither itself nor T had been able to respond publicly to them. It would not be long before X was of an age where she and her friends could uncover the material posted by H on the internet.

Furthermore, it submitted, H’s accounts had been circulated widely and in a manner calculated to do the most damage to T and X. The applicant recognised the difficulty of regulating information in the public domain and the need to counterbalance the false and tendentious material in the public domain. It further contended that an order should be made by the court against H under section 91(14) of the act, to prevent any application by H in relation to X under the act without the court’s permission for a period of two years. The application would be allowed.

(1) The present case was unprecedented. In a society that prided itself on the rule of law, the courts had to be obeyed. Any disobedience of court orders had to be deplored. In the circumstances, there was a need to put material into the public domain. It was important for the world to know that two judges had found that T was not a paedophile and that it was in the interests of his daughter that she live with him.

Furthermore, it was important for the court in the present hearing to state that, in the light of the information in the case, it had reached the same conclusion. X’s name would continue to be withheld, for the reason that children ought not to be named in Children Act proceedings and ought to be protected as much as possible (see [28]-[33], [37] of the judgment).

The judgments of November 2010 and February 2011 would be made public, along with other appropriate information (see [40], [41] of the judgment).

(2) In the circumstances, it would be justified, proportionate and appropriate to make an order under section 91(14). X and her father, above all, required a period of respite from litigation (see [51] of the judgment). An order under section 91(14) would be made, forbidding any application by H without the court’s permission for a period of two years (see [52] of the judgment).