Administration of justice – Ancillary relief – Anonymity – Conspiracy

Sally Ann Lykiardopulo (appellant) v Panaghis Nicholas Fotis Lykiardopulo (respondent) and Michael Lykiardopulo (interested party): CA (Civ Div) (Lords Justices Thorpe, Stanley Burnton, Tomlinson): 19 November 2010

The appellant former wife (W) appealed against a decision that a judgment in ancillary relief proceedings should be reported after anonymisation.

The ancillary relief proceedings between W and her respondent former husband (H) culminated in a 10-day trial. The judge found that H, his brother and another influential family member had conspired to manufacture, for the purposes of the trial, documents to show that H had terminated his involvement with the family business and divested himself of his interest therein. The family was a Greek ship-owning family. Having rejected the false case presented by the family, the judge ordered H to transfer to W assets and cash amounting to some £20m. W applied for public reporting of the judgment, which H opposed. The judge took the middle path between public reporting sought by W and no reporting sought by H and his brother, and held that the judgment should be reported after anonymisation. H submitted that the business interests of the family were entitled to protection under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 and that the risk of injury to H’s health had to be safeguarded.

Held: (1) The judge had identified the articles of the convention that were engaged and balanced them to arrive at her conclusion. The conclusion which she reached accorded with the practice of the Family Division in respect of anonymity (see paragraphs 53-54 of judgment).

(2) The principal consideration for the judge was the protection of the commercial interests of the family. But that consideration had no evidential foundation other than a general assertion by H. Without an evidential foundation, the assumption of commercial harm was implausible (paragraph 65).

(3) In so far as anything in the judgment could be said to be commercially sensitive, then it could simply be redacted (paragraph 64).

(4) As to H’s health, again the evidential base was thin (paragraph 68).

(5) The judge considered, as a factor in favour of anonymisation, the prospect of parties feeling obliged to attend before external arbitrators in order to avoid the potential of automatic disclosure of private matters. However, there was no public policy objection to parties opting for an arbitrator or what was known as ‘private judging’, Spencer v Spencer [2009] EWHC 1529 (Fam), [2009] EMLR 25 considered (paragraph 69).

(6) The desire of the children of the family for privacy weighed little since it was so little evidenced (paragraph 70).

(7) Public judgment or the threat of public judgment should not be used as an aid to enforcement (paragraph 72).

(8) The judge erred in placing unwarranted weight on the risk of future harm to the family’s business if the family’s perjury in the ancillary relief proceedings was published. Exercising the discretion afresh, there should be a public judgment. The judgment should be redacted to protect the privacy of H and the family wherever that protection could be given without reducing or veiling the scale of their litigation misconduct (paragraph 73).

(9) The first attempt by counsel to anonymise the judgment in the instant case went too far; anonymisation had very clear limits which did not extend to falsification (paragraphs 49-51).

Appeal allowed.

Richard Spearman QC, Tim Bishop (instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers) for the appellant; Desmond Browne QC, Adam Wolanski, Stewart Leech (instructed by Atkins Thomson) for the respondent; David Balcombe QC (instructed by Manches) for the interested party.