Pre-trial or post-judgment relief - Injunction - Defendant publishing ‘Solicitors from Hell’ website

Law Society and others v Kordowski: QBD (Mr Justice Tugendhat): 7 December 2011

The first claimant was the Law Society of England and Wales. It represented the interests of every solicitor on the roll in England and Wales. The second claimant was a large firm of solicitors based in the south of England. The third claimant was a partner at a law firm. The defendant was the founder, operator and publisher of the ‘Solicitors from Hell’ website (the website).

It had been in existence since 2005. The website encouraged disgruntled members of the public to ‘NAME and SHAME your OPPRESSOR’ and add names of solicitors to the publicly available list on ‘Solicitors from Hell’. A fee of between £1 and £100, depending upon the size and prominence of the posting, was charged by the defendant. In the vast majority of cases the author of the posting was anonymous. The defendant claimed that the website provided a public service by publishing a ‘blacklist’ of law firms and solicitors that should be avoided.

It purported to encourage members of the public to ‘expose wrongdoing’ within the profession. The claimants contended that being listed and named on a website purporting to list ‘solicitors from hell’ was defamatory of itself. The claimants applied for interim injunctions requiring the defendant to cease publication of the website in its entirety and to restrain him from publishing any similar website. The causes relied upon were libel, harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and breach of the Data Protection Act 1998. The claim was brought as a representative action on behalf of all those featuring on the website and those who might, in the future, feature on the website.

The claimants contended that the website caused serious damage to the reputations of solicitors, law firms and others who were listed on it, causing them financial loss, embarrassment, anxiety and distress. By publishing and republishing such material on the website, knowing that it would be widely disseminated to clients and others via search engines, the defendant was harassing those listed on it. Far from providing a public service, the defendant was doing the public a disservice by encouraging them to refer to his website when selecting a lawyer, since he was encouraging them to use inaccurate information to choose a solicitor. The applications would be allowed.

(1) An interim injunction to restrain publication of a libel was granted only if there was no doubt that the words were defamatory, and only if there was no defence put forward which a jury, properly directed, could uphold. However, perpetual injunctions to restrain publication of a libel were commonly granted, either after trial, or after judgment was entered in default of defence (see [3] of the judgment).

In the instant case, the defendant had not pleaded any defence known to the law of libel. He had not pleaded truth or honest opinion, and had not formulated any defence of qualified privilege on a basis recognised by law. Since the words complained of alleged serious criminal, unethical and dishonest behaviour on the part of the second and third claimants, it was almost inevitable that the posting on the website had to have caused significant damage to their reputation. It was common practice for clients to undertake research on the internet before selecting a lawyer of a law firm. The postings had produced prominent adverse search engine listings for anyone undertaking a search in the second claimant’s name. There was no conceivable basis upon which the defendant could justify the allegations and no other grounds upon which he could defend a claim for libel (see [35], [40], [43], [46], [55] of the judgment).

(2) In the instant case, the publication by the defendant on the website of the name of solicitors and individuals, including the third claimant, in the knowledge that such publications would inevitably come to their attention on more than one occasion and, on each occasion, cause them alarm and distress constituted harassment under the 1997 act. The publication was an ongoing one on a prominent website.

Accordingly, the distress and alarm caused by the publication would also be continuous. It was reasonable to infer in every case that those posted on the website had suffered such distress and alarm on at least two occasions. It was plain beyond argument that it had not been pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition of requirement imposed by any person under any enactment and was not reasonable (see [61], [64], [75] of the judgment). Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 246 (Jul) considered.

(3) In the instant case, the defendant was the data controller. In breach of the 1998 act the defendant had not processed the personal data of the solicitors and other individuals named on the website fairly and lawfully. The defendant had processed the said personal data in a grossly unfair and unlawful way. Further, the personal and sensitive data processed by the defendant and published on the website had not been accurate, indeed it was usually seriously inaccurate (see [82]-[83], [89], [91] of the judgment).

The defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending the libel claims and there was no good reason why judgment in default of defence should not be entered, or why the defendant should be allowed to defend the claim. Similarly for the claim in harassment, the defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, and there was no good reason why the defendant should be allowed to defend the claim. The position was the same in relation to the claim under the 1998 act.

Accordingly, the claimants and represented parties were entitled to a perpetual injunction preventing the defendant from further publishing the website (see [131]-[135], [140]-[142], [173] of the judgment).

Hugh Tomlinson QC and Sarah Mansoori (instructed by Brett Wilson) for the claimants; the defendant appeared in person.