Trial - Possessing firearm without certificate

R v Gregory [2011] All ER (D) 235 (Jun)

Section 1 of the Firarms Act 1068, so far as was material, provides: '(1) Subject to any exemption under this Act, it is an offence for a person (a) to have in his possession, or to purchase or acquire, a firearm to which this section applies without holding a firearm certificate in force at the time, or otherwise than as authorised by such a certificate; (b) to have in his possession, or to purchase or acquire, any ammunition to which this section applies without holding a firearm certificate in force at the time, or otherwise than as authorised by such a certificate, or in quantities in excess of those so authorised.'

The defendant, aged 27, and his mother were under police surveillance.

They were observed by police officers going into a wood in Wiltshire.

After about an hour later, they emerged and went into a car.

The defendant was the front seat passenger and his mother was the driver.

The car was stopped by the police officers and in the boot, a sawn-off shotgun was found.

The defendant was arrested and charged with possessing an altered firearm without a firearm certificate, contrary to s 1(1)(a) of the Firearms Act 1968 (count one) and with possessing a firearm when prohibited, contrary to s 21(1) of that Act (count two).

In interview, he contended that he had stopped in the wood to urinate, and that whilst there, he had noticed a package, which upon inspection, contained the firearm.

He had picked it up and walked back to the car.

His original intention had been to keep the shotgun but, upon his mother’s urging, he had decided to hand it in and on the way to the police station, he had been stopped and arrested.

The prosecution case on count one was that the defendant had entered the wood to collect the sawn-off shotgun.

On count two, the case against the defendant was that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm because he had previously been sentenced to four years’ detention.

The judge ruled that the offence under s 1(1) of the Act was an offence of absolute liability.

Following that direction, the defendant pleaded guilty to counts one and two, for which he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and three years’ imprisonment respectively.

The defendant appealed against conviction.

He submitted, in respect of count one, that the judge had erred in ruling that the offence under s 1(1) of the Act was one of absolute liability, thereby depriving him of a defence.

Parliament could not have intended to criminalise an individual who took possession of a firearm in order to hand it over to the police.

He later submitted that the defence of duress of circumstances would have been open to him, and accordingly, the guilty plea had been entered on a flawed basis, thereby rendering the conviction unsafe.

The appeal would be dismissed.

(1) The offence under s 1(1) of the Act of possessing a firearm without a firearm certificate was an offence of strict liability not of absolute liability.

It might not be sufficient or fair to the public-spirited citizen to assume that he or she would never be prosecuted in such circumstances, or that, if a prosecution were mounted, the case would be disposed otherwise than by an absolute discharge.

R v Zahid [2010] EWCA Crim 2158 applied.

(2) The defence of duress of circumstances was of very limited ambit. Nevertheless, it was possible to envisage circumstances in which, in the context of possession of a firearm, it might arise.

Each case had to be decided in the light of their individual facts when they arose.

In the instant case, the effect of the judge’s ruling was correct, although he had erred in describing the offence as one of absolute liability.

There was never any doubt that there had been a time when the defendant was voluntarily in possession of the firearm, and that he had remained in possession of it intending to keep it for his own use.

Even on the best possible view of his account, he had had no altruistic or public spirited intention, and there ware no circumstances which created the slightest duress.

Accordingly, the ruling made by the judge was not only correct in the context in which he had been considering it, but, on the facts on which he had based his ruling, no defence had been disclosed.

It followed that the guilty plea on count one had been a properly informed and voluntary one and that the conviction was safe.

Marcus Tregilgas-Davey (assigned by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for the defendant. Richard Tutt (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for the Crown.