Criminal procedure &150; admissibility - convictions - DNA evidence - profiling - jury deliberations - jury directions - prejudice - rape - severability

R v Paul Karl Thomas: CA (Crim Div) (Lord Justice Scott Baker, Mr Justice Leveson, Mr Justice Davis): 14 September 2006


The appellant (T) appealed against a conviction for rape of a woman (B) after a trial at which he had been convicted of the rape of B, the rape of another woman (H), and indecent assault of a woman (S), all within a two-year period.


In the original investigations into the attacks on B, S and H, DNA testing showed that the assailant in each case was the same. Some ten years later, T had been subjected to DNA swabbing for unrelated matters, and his DNA was found to match that of the assailant in the unsolved cases of B, S and H. T had been charged with two counts of rape relating to B and H and one count of indecent assault relating to the incident with S.


The charges were all dealt with together in the same trial, despite T's application that the count relating to B be severed from the charges concerning H and S under section 5(3) of the Indictments Act 1915.


T submitted that: the judge had erred in his refusal to allow the charge relating to B to be severed because the inclusion of that evidence was prejudicial to a fair trial, on the basis that the case against him was substantially weaker than in those relating to S and H; the DNA testing technique used on the semen swab sample from B was outdated; and the judge's direction on the cross-admissibility of evidence from the three attacks was inadequate.


Held, the conviction was safe, as there was ample evidence for the jury to convict T without the need for a separate trial, since: the attack on B took place close to T's former home; he was known to frequent the pub where the attack occurred; and the description given by B could reasonably be said to fit that of T. Elements of prejudice were always likely where sexual offences were tried together and the evidence was not cross-admissible, but there was not enough to justify severance in this case.


Although tested using an outdated technique, expert evidence demonstrated that the DNA samples obtained from B were still highly likely to be from T.


The judge had been correct in his directions and had directed the jury to consider each individual count on the indictment separately, expressly stating that the evidence concerning each count related to that particular count only and could not lend any support to the other counts. The jury's questions to the judge about the use of the evidence relating to B were carefully worded and well articulated, demonstrating that they comprehended the issues before them and had understood what they were told by the judge. The three offences were inextricably linked, and the judge had been entitled to proceed with the trial on that basis.


Appeal dismissed.


SA Rodham for the appellant; S Canavan for the Crown.