Assaults on judges not uncommon
I used to sit at Milton Keynes. Last week’s assault on HHJ Perusko (tinyurl.com/5n8hxx2t) – a friend and former colleague – actually took place in the chambers in which I used to sit.
Apparently Judge Perusko was chased out of courtroom 1 where he was sitting, along the corridor, through his own chambers and into chambers 1, where he was violently pummelled.
It may be useful for you to have some background in view of the line being taken by the Ministry of Justice that ‘this is terribly rare and we take the security of judges seriously’.
Without thinking very hard, I can call to mind three incidents that occurred while I was at Milton Keynes.
One district judge sitting in chambers 3, which I occupied when I was first appointed, and where the judge and the litigants are seated around a table in a fairly small room (I remember repeatedly emphasising that there were certain kinds of case which it simply was not safe to list in there), had the contents of a water carafe thrown at her from point-blank range.
I made a possession order against a man who had correctly been identified by security as a potential problem. He would have flattened me but for an alert security guard who had a nose for trouble and stationed himself just behind him (the man got about half a yard before the security guard had him firmly in a half-nelson).
A district judge colleague who was heavily pregnant was chased out of her chambers before the litigant in question strolled out of the building as cool as you like.
Where I take issue with your report is where it is implied that Milton Keynes (a lovely court to work at, and I still miss the staff there) is an exception. Certainly, on one occasion when I was sitting (unusually at Luton), I had completed a small claims hearing (again, the situation of the litigants and judge seated around a table). A female defendant was purple with rage at my finding against her and stood about six feet from me clutching a full carafe – which, with the foresight that characterises HM Courts & Tribunals Service, was a solid glass one. On that occasion, nothing happened. She calmed down, and – which is perhaps the crucial point – I thought nothing more of it.
I suspect that if your colleagues start asking around they will find that the problem is much more widespread than the MoJ would like to admit.
Neil Hickman, Former district judge, Milton Keynes (2000-2016)
Sometimes the law is wrong
I read Joshua Rozenberg’s column ‘Causes and effect – can juries spurn the law?’ (1 December) with interest. I think he, and indeed some of the commentators he quotes, have missed the point.
Supposing parliament made a law requiring all those who voted to remain in the EU to wear an armband whenever they went in public with the word ‘traitor’ on it, so that they could be easily identified as undesirable and unpatriotic members of society. Such a law would be utterly heinous and properly be regarded as such by every right-thinking and fair-minded member of society – but it would still be the law. Then suppose Mr X and his family, as proud ‘remainers’, were brought before the court for having broken this law. They admit having failed to wear the prescribed arm band and the judge makes it clear to the jury what the law is. Should the jury convict?
The resounding answer to this question is ‘no’. The jury should acquit the defendants because such a law is hateful and obviously wrong.
As lawyers we uphold the law, and for the most part, the law aligns with what society considers the rules should be for a properly ordered and fair society. But it does not always do so, and the ability of a jury to acquit a defendant even where the law is clear is an important control upon the abuse by parliament of its law-making power.
The [Clive] Ponting case is the one that every law student knows. He leaked information that showed the government was lying and a jury decided that his actions were – whatever the law said – not a criminal act. Although it was an earthquake at the time, looking back on it now it is obvious Ponting was right and the state was wrong. The government should not lie to the governed.
Whether you agree with them or not, the dumping of a statue of a former slave trader into the sea and the smashing of windows owned by a bank which has been profiteering from environmental damage would have been seen by a large proportion of the population as laudable acts, and not ones which should attract a criminal sanction. One supposes that the juries in both cases were of that mind.
Bluntly, juries exist because sometimes the state tries to criminalise people for their actions, when the view of citizens is that it is the law and not the proscribed action that is wrong.
J. Howard Shelley, Bilston West Midlands
Unwitting benefactor
On 20 October the BBC reported that an elite law firm had rescinded job offers for three Ivy League students who blamed Israel for Hamas attacks. UK elite law firms will doubtless follow suit – despite past transgressions.
In 1961, as a newly qualified solicitor at Slaughter and May, the senior partner asked me my religion at his party for new recruits. I told him I was Jewish, prompting a letter next day cancelling my appointment.
On hearing of this, a friend’s father, Lewis Silman, told me Rothschilds Bank paid Slaughter and May £500,000 annually (£10m today) for legal services, and arranged for me to report my experience to his partner, Leopold de Rothschild.
I later joined Freshfields. My boss announced a few months later that he could not understand why Freshfields were getting so much Rothschild work.
I never told Freshfields that I may have unwittingly been one of their greatest benefactors.
Trevor Lyttleton, London NW11
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